Adaptive Inflation Expectations Hypothesis Minimizes Effectiveness of Fed Communication at ZLB

More on the adaptive inflation expectations hypothesis by Robert @ Angry Bear

My claim is that expected inflation over the next 5 (and 10 and 20) years is very similar to actual inflation over the past year.  I think the data generally fit the crudest most mechanical adaptive expectations hypothesis.

This would be interesting for two reasons.

First, the adaptive expectations hypothesis has been treated with utter contempt for roughly 4 decades.  It is considered an example of the sort of thing which economists must utterly reject.  The effort to replace it has lead to a lot of mildly interesting math and highly implausible assumptions.  

Second, there is a huge and very vigorous discussion of forward guidance by the Fed Open Market (FOMC) Committee.  It has been argued that even when the Federal Funds rate is essentially zero, the FOMC can stimulate the economy by causing higher expected inflation.  It is generally agreed that the FOMC has been convinced by this argument.  I think this implies that there should be anonalous increases in expected inflation on the dates when the FOMC began to try to cause higher expected inflation -- roughly the announcements of QE 1-4, operation twist and of forward guidance of how long it will keep the Federal Funds rate extremely low.  An excellent fit of expected inflation using only lagged inflation creates serious difficulty for those who think the FOMC always could and finally has promoted higher expected inflation.

Woj’s Thoughts - This topic is reminiscent of a chain of posts nearly six months ago that began with JW Mason’s inquiry, Does the Fed Control Interest Rates? Jazzbumpa and Art Shipman chimed in with their own opinions, the latter providing this relevant chart on the path of interest rates over time:
Responding to the others’, my view was that:

market expectations of future Fed action are sticky. During the post-war period until about 1980, inflation was consistently rising despite mainstream economic views that suggested those conditions would not persist. Following a lengthy inter-war period of near rock-bottom interest rates, market participants were slow to adjust expectations to the actual height of interest rates that would occur before sustained disinflation began. Once disinflation began in the early 1980’s, market expectations were equally slow in recognizing how long disinflation could persist and therefore how low the Fed would ultimately take rates (and hold at zero).

Returning to Robert’s claim, I suspect the recent strong correlation between the previous year’s actual inflation and inflation expectations for the next 5 or 20 years is partially due to the lengthy period of low inflation that came prior. In other words, if inflation were to start trending higher or lower over an elongated period, I predict inflation expectations would lag actual inflation while moving in the same direction. The adaptive inflation expectations hypothesis will therefore still hold, only more years of recent data will need to be incorporated into expectations formation. Validation of this hypothesis will deal a serious blow to the perception that Fed communications at the ZLB are an effective form of stimulus.

Why the Federal Reserve Mandate Means That Bernanke Doesn't Have to Worry About Bubbles

Earlier this week I discussed the dangers of misunderstanding “helicopter money” and higher inflation targets. A focus of that post was the incentives stemming from negative real interest rates that will lead to greater investment in real assets, not businesses. The obvious implication is that negative real interest rates entail significant risk of spurring asset bubbles.

This discussion of asset bubbles comes on the heels of St. Louis Federal Reserve Governor Jeremy Stein’s speech that suggested the Fed was becoming increasingly concerned about bubbles, not inflation. According to a recent Bloomberg article, apparently Fed Chairman Bernanke was not onboard with the supposed shift (h/t Tim Duy):

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke minimized concerns that the central bank’s easy monetary policy has spawned economically-risky asset bubbles in comments at a meeting with dealers and investors this month, according to three people with knowledge of the discussions.

Do Bernanke’s comments imply the change Stein alluded to is not really happening? Not necessarily. To understand why, one must consider the goals assigned to Bernanke or any Fed Chairman for that matter. The following is from Chapter 2 of the Federal Reserve System’s own publication, Purposes & Functions:

The goals of monetary policy are spelled out in the Federal Reserve Act, which specifies that the Board of Governors and the Federal Open Market Committee should seek “to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”

Although no explicit mention of preventing asset bubbles is made, the goal of stable prices leaves the door open for such an interpretation. Before addressing the Fed’s own interpretation of stable prices, its worth discussing the specific types of assets that are seemingly most prone to bubbles. The three major categories are commodities (e.g. oil, copper, sugar), financial assets (e.g. stocks and bonds), and housing. During the past decade real interest rates have actually been negative more often than not (Real Interest Rate = Effective Fed Funds rate - core PCE):


Unsurprisingly the past decade has also witnessed asset bubbles in commodities, stocks and housing:


Prices of these assets have clearly been anything but stable. So has the Fed failed in that aspect of its mandate? The answer is a resounding “NO.”

To remedy the cognitive dissonance readers may be experiencing, consider how the aforementioned real assets affect the FOMC’s preferred inflation measure, core Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE). Financial assets are noteworthy in their distinct omission from the type of products making up PCE. Commodities are included in the general price measure, however core PCE is calculated by excluding a couple of the more volatile commodity components: food and energy. Housing is actually included in core PCE but is calculated using the space rent of nonfarm owner-occupied homes, not actual house prices. Focusing on core PCE thereby removes any direct concern with asset bubbles.

Bernanke has already announced his plans to step down as Fed Chairman early next year (2014). Given the Fed’s stated mandate and preferred measure of prices, it is no wonder that Bernanke is unconcerned with asset bubbles. The goals of his chair are to maximize employment and maintain stable prices. Since the types of assets prone to bubbling are not included in core PCE and appear relatively uncorrelated with that measure, to the degree that bubbles can benefit employment in the short run, they may actually be desirable.*

These institutional incentives of a Fed Chairman are unfortunately at odds with the country’s longer term economic goals. Asset bubbles created by excessive lending and/or negative real interest rates are always followed by busts. These busts are simply the recognition of malinvestment that already took place during the boom. If the booms are financed with significant leverage, the resulting deleveraging may lead to a debt deflationary spiral. Whether or not that’s the case, though it usually is, malinvestment suppresses both employment and economic growth over time.

One can argue over whether Bernanke’s views on the effectiveness of monetary policy are correct or not, but his decision to ignore asset bubbles is perfectly rational given the circumstances. Shifting the Fed’s focus from inflation to bubbles will therefore require changing the institutional incentives.


*The three major asset categories mentioned above presumably will have very different effects on employment. Among the three, commodity bubbles are least desirable from an employment perspective. Higher commodity prices generally hurt consumer spending, which may lead to a temporary decline in employment. Housing bubbles are the most desirable in these terms since the increased demand can generate a temporary employment boom in construction and housing-related services.  

The Dangers of Misunderstanding "Helicopter Money" and Higher Inflation Targets

Ashwin Parameswaran has a fantastic post today explaining why Helicopter Money Is Not Dangerous, All Macroeconomic Policy Is Dangerous “in the sense that irresponsible implementation can lead to macroeconomic chaos.” Before jumping into the main attraction of the post, I want to briefly clarify a general discrepancy regarding what helicopter money actually entails.

More than forty years ago, Milton Friedman famously quipped that price deflation can be fought by "dropping money out of a helicopter."[37] Friedman was referring to central bank policy and, to this day, a “helicopter drop” is typically associated with monetary policies, such as quantitative easing (QE). This is an unfortunate interpretation of monetary policy since most central banks, including the Federal Reserve, are as equally unable to actually implement a “helicopter drop” today as they were back in 1969. Willem Buiter clarifies how the policy could realistically be implemented in a paper on “Helicopter Money” (equations omitted):

Technically, if the Central Bank could make transfer payments to the private sector, the entire (real-time) Friedmanian helicopter money drop could be implemented by the Central Bank without Treasury assistance.

…

The legality of such an implementation of the helicopter drop of money by the Central Bank on its own would be doubtful in most countries with clearly drawn boundaries between the Central Bank and the Treasury.  The Central Bank would be undertaking an overtly fiscal act, something which is normally the exclusive province of the Treasury.47

An economically equivalent (albeit less entertaining) implementation of the helicopter drop of money would be a tax cut (or a transfer payment) implemented by the Treasury, financed through the sale of Treasury debt to the Central Bank, which would then monetise the transaction. If the direct sale of Treasury debt to the Central Bank (or direct Central Bank lending to the Treasury) is prohibited (as it is for the countries that belong to the Euro area), the monetisation of the tax cut could be accomplished by the Treasury financing the tax through the sale of Treasury debt to the domestic private sector (or overseas), with the Central Bank purchasing that same amount of non-monetary interest bearing debt in the secondary market, thus expanding the base money supply. (2004: p. 59-60)

One might inquire whether changing to a “permanent floor” monetary policy regime alters the necessity of monetisation. Apparently prepared for such a future outcome, Buiter says:

This difference between the effects of monetising a government deficit and financing it by issuing non-monetary debt persists even if the interest rates on base money and on non-monetary debt are the same (say zero), now and in the future.  When both money and bonds bear a zero nominal interest rate, there remains a key difference between them: the principal of the bonds is redeemable, the principal of base money is not. (2004: p. 10)

Although monetisation may be necessary to achieve the full effect of “helicopter money,” this practice does not alter the dangers associated with the Treasury’s actions. As Ashwin points out:

Whether they are monetised or not, excessive fiscal deficits are inflationary.

On the topic of inflation, I have recently been engaging in a debate with Mike Sax (see here and here) about the potential benefits of targeting a higher inflation rate. This policy has garnered support from both sides of the political and economic aisle (New Keynesians and Monetarists), yet I think its potential benefits are being extremely oversold. My two basic arguments against such a policy are the following:
1) Higher inflation does not necessarily entail higher nominal wages (which many people clearly assume). 

Aside from the top quintile of households, real income has been declining for nearly 15 years. The only way higher inflation helps reduce real debt burdens is if nominal wages increase faster than nominal interest rates on debt. If instead higher inflation stems primarily from higher costs-of living (nominal food and energy prices), than most Americans may find themselves in the precarious position of requiring even more debt to maintain current living standards.

2) Higher inflation alters saving, investment and consumption decisions which can lead to a misallocation of capital. On this second point is where Ashwin’s post really hits home:

During most significant hyperinflations throughout history, the catastrophic phase where money loses all value has been triggered by the central bank’s enforcement of highly negative real interest rates which encourages the rich and the well-connected to borrow at negative real rates and invest in real assets. The most famous example was the Weimar hyperinflation in Germany in the 1920s during which the central bank allowed banks and industrialists to borrow from it at as low an interest rate of 5% when inflation was well above 100%. The same phenomenon repeated itself during the hyperinflation in Zimbabwe during the last decade (For details on both, see my post ‘Hyperinflation, Deficits and Real Interest Rates’).

This also highlights the danger in simply enforcing a higher inflation target without taking the level of real interest rates into account. For example, if the Bank of England decided to target an inflation rate of 6% with the bank rates remaining at 0.50%, the risk of an inflationary spiral will increase dramatically as more and more private actors are tempted to borrow at a negative real rate and invest in real assets. Large negative real rates rarely incentivise those with access to cheap borrowing to invest in businesses. After all, why bother with building a business when borrowing and buying a house can make you rich? Moreover, just as was the case during the Weimar hyperinflation, it is only the rich and the well-connected crony capitalists and banks who benefit during such an episode. If the “danger” from macroeconomic policy is defined as the possibility of a rapid and spiralling loss of value in money, then negative real rates are far more dangerous than helicopter money.

These pernicious traits of higher inflation and especially negative real interest rates are entirely compatible with recent experience. Households and businesses “with access to cheap borrowing” have been pouring money into stock, bond, housing and commodity markets rather than investing in tangible capital. The remarkable rise in asset prices has unfortunately not funneled down to households in the bottom four quintiles of income and wealth, only furthering the inequality gap. Recognition of these effects is precisely why a Federal Reserve fearing bubbles, not inflation, would be a significant step in the right direction.

To be clear, similar to Ashwin, I am in favor of “helicopter money” and believe higher wages for the bottom 80 percent are key to ending the balance sheet recession as well as ensuring more sustainable growth and unemployment going forward. Targeting higher inflation and larger negative real interest rates is the wrong approach to achieve these goals and may actually work in the opposite direction. Yes, all macroeconomic policy is dangerous. But even more dangerous is misunderstood and misrepresented macroeconomic policy.
 

Bibliography
Buiter, Willem H., Helicopter Money: Irredeemable Fiat Money and the Liquidity Trap (December 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w10163. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=478673

The Rise of Debt, Interest, and Inequality

According to Paul Krugman, he’s “had a mild-mannered dispute with Joe Stiglitz over whether individual income inequality is retarding recovery right now.” Since both Nobel Laureates were focusing on gross private savings, I broke down that measure by individual components and sub-components. Insights gained from those charts led to the conclusion that:

This data is consistent with rising income and wealth inequality but requires reversing Stiglitz’s “underconsumption” hypothesis. Trying to maintain relative consumption levels, many households clearly chose to rely on previous savings or new debt as a means of temporarily boosting consumption. As inequality continues to rise, wealthy households are now electing to retain more of their savings within corporations. It doesn’t take a leap of faith to suggest this combination of factors depresses aggregate demand.

Still unconvinced, Krugman has been searching for further data (see here and here) that would lead him to believe inequality really is holding back the recovery.

Hoping to aid Krugman in his quest and expand upon my “overconsumption” theory, let me respond to a critique of the previous post. Over at Mike Norman Economics, a commenter (Ryan Harris) kindly noted the obvious omission of interest income and sectoral balances. After sorting through interactive data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, here are net amounts of monetary and imputed interest by sector [positive (negative) total implies sector receives (pays) net interest]:

Unsurprising to those familiar with sectoral balance analysis, households net interest position took a sharp turn upwards when federal budget deficits began expanding more rapidly in 1980:

Around the same time, household interest income received a significant boost from the nonfinancial business sector. The pronounced decline in the net interest position of that sector aligns closely with high interest rates of the preceding period and a massive expansion of nonfinancial corporate debt shortly afterwards:

Since then the rise and fall of nonfinancial interest payments (and outstanding debt) has tracked the business cycle, with the overall trend remaining steadily lower (higher net payments and outstanding debt). Although these transfers support household income, they also increase income inequality since wealthy households hold a vast majority of financial assets (including corporate debt).

Turning to the foreign (rest of the world) sector, the U.S. current account (trade) balance fell heavily in the 1990’s:

Foreign countries began amassing large quantities of U.S. financial assets (primarily Treasuries) corresponding to the substantial trade deficits. The growth in net interest receipts arising from these holdings represents an ongoing leak in domestic aggregate demand.
   
With the beginning of a new millennium and the dot-com bubble, a hostile environment was created for the household net interest position. Federal budget surpluses, declining interest rates, rapidly expanding trade deficits, and increasing payments to the financial sector (for housing) led to a nearly 40% decline in household net interest receipts. Combined with increasing income inequality, many households drew upon savings and increased demand for new debt to maintain previous levels of consumption.

A side effect of the budget surpluses was a growing desire for safe financial assets separate from U.S. Treasuries. Securitization provided a means for new loans of varying risk to be converted into supposedly “super-safe” assets and transferred off of bank’s balance sheets. These factors encouraged banks to meet the surging demand for new loans coming from households (Chart: Household Debt-to-GDP):

The effects of these transactions can also be seen in the transfer of net interest payments from households, and later businesses, to the financial sector. Apart from adding to inequality, these transfers reduce aggregate demand since, as Michael Hudson notes in The Bubble and Beyond, “financial institutions tend to save all their income.” (2012: Kindle Locations 6814-6815)

Since the financial crisis ended, the trend towards higher net interest receipts by the financial sector and greater net interest payments by the nonfinancial corporate sector have returned. These transfers of income up the income/wealth ladder serve to exacerbate the weak demand stemming from two decades of stagnating household interest income. Unfortunately, and so far unsuccessfully, public policy (fiscal and monetary) remains dedicated to originating a new private debt led boom.  

The changes in net interest payments/receipts over the past few decades highlight the growing income and wealth disparities present in our society. For many years households dug themselves deeper in debt to maintain relative consumption levels. The costs of excessively accumulating private debt have now been recognized, but the burden of interest payments suppressing aggregate demand will be felt for years to come.  

  
Bibliography
Hudson, Michael (2012-10-04). THE BUBBLE AND BEYOND (Kindle Locations 6814-6815). ISLET. Kindle Edition.

The Impossible Trinity or The Permanent Floor: Adding Modern Money to Mundell-Fleming

The Impossible Trinity (also known as the Trilemma) is a trilemma in international economics which states that an economy cannot simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate, free capital movement, and an independent monetary policy. This principle was initially derived from the Mundell-Fleming model, also known as the IS-LM-BoP model. Although the model was first outlined by Mundell and Fleming 50 years ago, to this day it continues to play a significant role informing public policy. For this reason it also remains a staple of Ph.D. programs, even those that generally despise Keynesian economics.

While many students may accept the model’s conclusions based on its longevity and the professions’ widespread adherence (which may be wise), I was naturally skeptical. What are the model’s assumptions? Will different monetary regimes alter the conclusions? What does it even mean to have “an independent monetary policy”? In search of answers, I sought out one of the original sources.

“Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates” by R.A. Mundell was published in The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science all the way back in November 1963. At the time the world’s major industrial nations were adhering to the Bretton Woods system, under which the U.S. dollar was convertible to gold and all other countries involved tied their currencies to the U.S. dollar. Recognizing the expansion of global trade taking place, Mundell sought to outline “the theoretical and practical implications of the increased mobility of capital. (p.475)” To simplify the conclusions Mundell begins by assuming “the extreme degree of mobility that prevails when a country cannot maintain an interest rate different from the general level prevailing abroad. (p.475)” He further assumes “that all securities in the system are perfect substitutes” and therefore the “existing exchange rates are expected to persist indefinitely. (p.475)” The last assumption presently worth noting is that “Monetary policy will be assumed to take the form of open market purchases of securities. (p.476)”

While these assumptions may have been valid within the Bretton Woods system, that system was terminated in 1971 by President Nixon unilaterally canceling the direct convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold. Since then the U.S. and several other major industrial nations have been operating using a fiat currency. Under this new monetary regime, without convertibility, there is little reason to believe that all currencies are even near perfect substitutes or that exchange rates will persist for any defined period of time. Furthermore the end of the Bretton Woods system marked the beginning of inflation targeting as the primary method of monetary policy.

Monetary policy was still enacted through open market operations after the regime change, but those operations were now performed to maintain an target interest rate. The more significant difference is that using interest rates as the primary tool for targeting inflation ensured interest rates would be maintained at levels different from those prevailing abroad. This “corridor” system of inflation targeting would last in the U.S. for nearly 40 years before being replaced by a “permanent floor” system in 2008.

Breaking with previous tradition, the “permanent floor” system (also known as interest-on-reserves regime) allows central banks to control interest rates separate from engaging in open market operations. Interest rates are now (largely) determined by the interest-on-reserves (IOR) rate, while excess reserves give the central bank freedom to let the monetary base fluctuate more widely.  

Returning to Mundell’s paper, he begins by analyzing monetary policy under flexible exchange rates:

“Consider the effect of an open market purchase of domestic securities in the context of a flexible exchange rate system. This results in an increase in bank reserves, a multiple expansion of money and credit, and downward pressure on the rate of interest. But the interest rate is prevented from falling by an outflow of capital, which causes a deficit in the balance of payments, and a depreciation of the exchange rate. In turn, the exchange rate depreciation (normally) improves the balance of trade and stimulates, by the multiplier process, income and employment. A new equilibrium is established when income has risen sufficiently to induce the domestic community to hold the increased stock of money created by the banking system. Since interest rates are unaltered this means that income must rise in proportion to the increase in the money supply, the factor of proportionality being the given ratio of income and money (income velocity). (p.477)”

The earlier review of changes to the monetary regime makes it clear that this causal chain is fraught with errors. Starting from the beginning, “an increase in bank reserves” does not cause “a multiple expansion of money and credit” (see here) nor will it lead to “downward pressure on the rate of interest.” If interest rates are unchanged, there should be no outflow of capital and no subsequent depreciation of the exchange rate. The balance of trade therefore remains the same and the “multiplier process” never takes place. In complete contrast to Mundell’s conclusion, monetary policy (effectively QE) has no effect on income or employment under flexible exchange rates.*

Switching to monetary policy under fixed exchange rates:

“A central bank purchase of securities creates excess reserves and puts downward pressure on the interest rate. But a fall in the interest rate is prevented by a capital outflow, and this worsens the balance of payments. To prevent the exchange rate from falling the central bank intervenes in the market, selling foreign exchange and buying domestic money. The process continues until the accumulated foreign exchange deficit is equal to the open market purchase and the money supply is restored to its original level. (p. 479)”

As previously stated, the creation of excess reserves no longer affects the interest rate. This prevents the rest of Mundell’s process from taking place, but nonetheless results in the conclusion that monetary policy is ineffective.

This fixed exchange rate simulation serves as the basis for the Impossible trinity. Given free capital flows and a fixed exchange rate, the central bank is forced to counteract open market operations with equivalent opposing actions in the foreign exchange market. Since the money supply is ultimately unchanged, the country is said to have relinquished its monetary policy independence. However, under the current monetary policy regime this outcome is drastically altered.

Mundell examines the common case of a country trying “to prevent the exchange rate from falling. (p. 479)” Using a “permanent floor” system the central bank can maintain its interest rate policy and a fixed exchange rate, but faces limitations since “the central bank intervenes in the market, selling foreign exchange and buying domestic money. (p. 479)” One limitation arises when the central bank runs out of salable foreign exchange. Another limitation occurs once the central bank drains all excess reserves from the system, forcing it to forgo either its interest rate or exchange rate policy. These limitations suggest the Impossible Trinity will hold in the long run.

Now consider the less frequent and more recent case of a country trying to prevent its exchange rate from rising. The central bank manipulates the market exchange rate by buying foreign exchange and selling domestic currency. Contrary to the previous example, the central banks actions suddenly appear unlimited. Since the central bank can always create new reserves, it faces no limitations in selling domestic currency. Meanwhile if the demand to trade foreign exchange for domestic currency dries up, then the central bank will have successfully defended its peg. Therefore, as long as the Fed is willing to accept the risks associated with a balance sheet full of foreign exchange, the Impossible trinity is no longer impossible.

The Impossible trinity stems from Mundell and Fleming’s attempt to incorporate an open economy into the IS-LM model. Their analysis reflects an understanding of the Bretton Woods system, which ruled monetary policy at that time. Today’s monetary system and policy operations are a far cry from the Bretton Woods system, yet the Mundell-Fleming model has not been updated accordingly. Beyond minimizing the effects of monetary policy, the transformation of monetary policy to a “permanent floor” system has made the previously impossible, possible.



*In reality, monetary policy (QE) will affect income and employment to some degree for reasons not outlined by Mundell. However, those effects are likely to be small and could be either positive or negative.

Related posts:
Does the Permanent Floor Affect the Inflationary Effects of the Platinum Coin?
The Permanent Floor and Potential Federal Reserve 'Insolvency'
Fed's Treasury Purchases Now About Asset Prices, Not Interest Rates
The Money Multiplier Fairy Tale
Currency Intervention and the Myth of the Fundamental Trilemma
IOR Killed the Money Multiplier
Despite Hicks' Denouncing His IS-LM Creation, The Classroom Gadget Lives On

Bibliography
Mundell, R. A. "Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates." The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 29.4 (1963): 475-85. Print.

Bubbling Up...1/25/13

1) S&P 500 Earnings Squiggles by Ed Yardeni @ Dr. Ed’s Blog

The estimates for 2012 and 2013 mostly fell all last year, yet the S&P 500 rose 13.4%. I have the Squiggles data back to 1979 on a monthly basis. More often than not, they tend to trend down; yet more often than not, the market has trended higher. That’s because the market discounts 12-month forward consensus expected earnings. A good proxy for this concept is forward earnings, i.e., the time-weighted average of consensus estimates for the current and coming years. It tends to be a good 12-month leading indicator for actual profits, with one important exception: Analysts don’t see recessions coming until we all do too.

Woj’s Thoughts - After viewing this chart a few times, several observations stand out from the rest: 1) Each “earnings squiggle” that rises near the end is associated with higher actual earnings. 2) Each “earnings squiggle” that falls near the end forecasts at least a temporary decline in actual earnings. 3) Earnings estimates for 2010, at the beginning of 2009, were higher than forecasts for the current year (2013) and equivalent to current estimates for 2014. 4) The clear upward bias in estimates promotes higher prices, to the degree market participants trust the forecasts. 


2) Why the US economic crisis is a depression and not a recession by Edward Harrison @ Credit Writedowns

What is now playing out in Congress is very much in line with what I said a little over three years ago in October 2009. Deficit fatigue has become too large to resist. Austerity is coming to the US. The crux here is to remember that this has been a crisis brought on by high private debt – not public debt or deficits. The government has been effective in preventing a private sector debt deflation by providing economic stimulus, permitting large-scale deficit spending and bailing out the banks. This has added a huge slug of net financial assets to the private sector and supported asset prices and private sector balance sheets. When these government deficits get cut, there will be serious pain in the private sector because balance sheets are still stressed and the result will be a relapse into economic depression.

Woj’s Thoughts - The House Republicans have agreed to temporarily raise the debt ceiling and postpone the debate over sequestration in return for Congress (focusing on the Senate Democrats) actually passing a budget for the first time in four years. Backed into a corner, this is probably the best decision for the Republicans as it puts the onus (temporarily) on Democrats to reach a budget agreement. This progression raises the chances that spending cuts, either tied to sequestration or the budget, will take place this year. With the tax hikes already in place, the smaller deficits could very well lead to the outcome that Edward fears.  

3) Ben Bernanke Is Facing A Legacy Problem by Bruce Krasting @ Money Game

Bernanke’s term at the Fed will set many historical precedents. To a significant extent, history will judge Bernanke on what he did while chairman of the Fed. But the books will also look at what happened after he left.

I believe that Bernanke would very much like to leave his successor with a Fed that had policy choices. As of today there are no options left.  Just more useless QE. I doubt that Bernanke wants to exit with the Fed’s foot planted firmly on the gas pedal. The next guy does deserve a cleaner plate than now exists.

Is the Legacy factor influencing Bernanke? I think it has some sway in his thinking. Consider what Greenspan did before he left. After years of soft monetary policy he ratcheted up the Federal Funds rate 17 times in 22 months. He took the funds rate from 1% all the way up to 6%. Part of that rapid increase was driven to get monetary policy “neutral”, so that Bernanke could do as he wished. Not long after Bernanke took over, he took the funds rate down to zero.

Clearly, Greenspan tried to get monetary policy back to neutral before he left, I don’t see any reason why Bernanke would think differently. Are we watching a repeat of history? At a minimum, his legacy, and where he wants the Fed to be when he leaves,  is part of Ben’s thinking today.

Woj’s Thoughts - It’s hard to argue with this logic given Greenspan’s actions as Fed Chairman prior to the last two years of his reign. While deserve is an overly strong word in this instance, my guess is the next Fed Chairman would appreciate having the option to ease, beyond merely expanding QE. With initial unemployment claims now at multi-year lows and a labor force still in decline, the table is set for a further meaningful drop in the unemployment rate. As the rate approaches 7 percent, I suspect Fed chatter about ending QE will pick up. If the legacy issue is simultaneously weighing on Bernanke’s mind, the urge to pull back on easing may be too great to ignore. Considering the ongoing multiple expansion in stock markets, it appears most market participants are not yet discounting this potential outcome.

Does the Permanent Floor Affect the Inflationary Effects of the Platinum Coin?

While continuing my own effort to further understanding of the permanent floor, related posts keep rolling in. Unfortunately my earlier post was remiss in recognizing contributions by Ashwin Parameswaran and Frances Coppola even prior to the outburst. A major player from the start, Steve Randy Waldman has once again raised the bar for a confederacy of dorks. David Beckworth, Peter Dorman, Nick Rowe and Stephen Williamson (see here, here, and here) also share their thoughts.

Once again, I won’t spend much time recapping the major points of contention. My intent is to highlight a few questions that came to mind while reading but, in my opinion, were not adequately addressed. Hopefully the answers put forth will shed light on areas of the debate that remain dark.

Question(s): What are the inflationary effects, if any, of the “platinum coin” both at and away from the zero lower bound (ZLB)? Under a “permanent floor” vs. “corridor” system?

Answer(s): As stated previously:

When the Treasury deposits a $1 trillion platinum coin at the Fed, the Fed credits the Treasury’s account with $1 trillion in reserves. These reserves, however, are not counted in the monetary base since the Treasury's account does not count as reserve balances in circulation. The simple action of depositing a platinum coin at the Fed therefore has no direct impact on the economy that would require sterilization*. In fact, the primary (sole?) purpose of this exchange is to allow the Treasury (Congress) to spend without requiring debt sales that would exceed the debt limit.

The platinum coin, in itself, is therefore not inflationary regardless of whether or not the economy is at the ZLB. The story, however, need not end there. Unburdened by the obligation to sell debt when deficit spending occurs, government deficit spending (up to the coin’s value) will directly increase the monetary base by adding reserves to the private banking system (reserves in circulation).

Operating within a “permanent floor” system, the Fed can maintain control of interest rates by paying a positive interest rate on reserves (IOR) AND elect whether or not to sterilize the monetary base expansion. If sterilized, the Fed could actually increase interest income in the private sector by selling assets with a higher yield. This would have an inflationary effect, though it may be offset by portfolio rebalancing. If left unsterilized, the monetary base expansion would likely generate asset price inflation and rising inflation expectations, at least in the short-run, given recent experiences with QE. In either case, the increase in deficit spending (otherwise not permitted by the debt limit) should ensure an overall inflationary bias.
 
Under the old monetary regime (pre-2008; “corridor” system), the Fed would probably sterilize the expansion by selling Treasuries (at least initially). Although the monetary base and interest rate are left unchanged, the deficit spending results in the private sector gaining net financial assets (NFAs; e.g. Treasuries). This is exactly the same result we see today! The only tweak is that the Fed, not Treasury, becomes the supplier of Treasuries.

Still under the old monetary regime, if left unsterilized, the expansion of the monetary base would push interest rates to the ZLB. The inflationary effects of the downward pressure on short-term rates depends on the time period in consideration (often short-term) and the degree of influence from several potential cross-currents (in no particular order):


1) Decreases interest income - deflationary
2) Weakens the currency - inflationary
3) Lowers debt service costs to borrowers - inflationary
4) Increases bank lending - inflationary
5) Raises inflation expectations - inflationary


The above list is in no way exhaustive, but does suggest an inflationary bias. Countering this view, Scott Sumner states:

higher interest rates are inflationary.  They increase velocity.  If you don’t believe me, check out interest rates and velocity during any extremely high inflation episode.  When rates rise, inflation usually rises.

Perhaps surprisingly, I do believe that interest rates and velocity show a relatively strong correlation over time. What I disagree with is the direction of causation that Sumner ascribes to this relationship. From my perspective, decreasing velocity implies decelerating bank lending and/or declining inflation expectations. Witnessing either of these factors would encourage the Fed to lower interest rates, hence any causation runs in the opposite direction of Sumner’s claim. Determining whether interest rates or velocity tends to move first would be enlightening, if feasible, but for now I’ll conclude that lower interest rates are inflationary.   

Under any of these circumstances, the transaction entailing a platinum coin between the Treasury and Fed, in and of itself, is not directly inflationary*. However, presuming the platinum coin is accompanied by greater deficit spending, some inflation will stem from the growth of private NFAs regardless of the monetary regime and sterilization decision. Corresponding monetary base expansion will also likely display an inflationary bias, unless the Fed elects to sterilize the expansion under the old “corridor” system. The platinum coin is therefore always inflationary.

Special thanks for their contributions through comments are still owed to Scott Fullwiler, JKH, RebelEconomist, Dan Kervick, Ashwin Parameswaran, wh10, Detroit Dan, K, JW Mason, jck and last, but not least, Mike Sax. Stay tuned for at least one more post in this series.

*it may indirectly impact the economy by altering expectations